ABSTRACT
Workers in online labor markets routinely misrepresent the value of effort, both through shirking and misreporting performance. We execute a field experiment on Amazon MTurk to determine whether honesty oaths impact the cost of worker lies. Employing a design that follows the "die roll" paradigm, we determine that oaths elicit more truthful behavior, although they primarily impact extreme lies. Oath-taking decreased the cost of misreporting by 12%. While shirking is widespread, oaths marginally decrease it. Male workers misreport performance more often on average than females, yet both sexes are equally responsive to oath-taking.

JEL Codes: D90, D91, C8, C93, J9

ATTACHMENTS

DOI
dx.doi.org/10.17504/protocols.io.bix7kfrn

DOCUMENT CITATION
https://dx.doi.org/10.17504/protocols.io.bix7kfrn

KEYWORDS
oaths, self-reporting, lying, MTurk, productivity, field experiment

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CREATED
Jul 23, 2020

LAST MODIFIED
Jul 23, 2020

DOCUMENT INTEGER ID
39647
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ATTACHMENTS

Supplemental Resources,
Clever Pennies: Honesty Oaths, Misreporting Performance, and MTurk
Babin, Chauhan, and Liu.pdf

Protocol and questionnaires found in attached document